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A. Nature of the Case 
Respondent disagrees with the nature of the case to the extent that the Appellant states 
that the case centers on a unilateral decision to relocate the children to Havre. The divorce decree 
has no restriction on relocation and it is further disputed that Zane·s residence is in Blackfoot; 
there is evidence that Zane resides primarily in Boise with his girlfriend and children at a home 
which he pays substantial rent on. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Respondent disagrees with Appellant's synopsis of the course of proceedings to the 
extent that it omitted that neither party filed for the use of formal rules of evidence pursuant to 
Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure 102. (Tr Vol. I, p. 11, Ln 12-16.) Also, there was a 
stipulation that the temporary order hearing be part of the record and entered into evidence. ([d. 
at p. 213, Ln 21-p. 214, Ln 3.) Further, the magistrate courts was able to interview the children 
at the temporary order hearing. (R Vol. I, p. 97, Hr'g Tr 5:1-4). In addition, the first time Zane's 
expert witnesses were disclosed to Chelsea was in Zane's Pretrial Memorandum on November 3. 
2015, which was after the cutoff for expert witness disclosures and after the hearing for 
temporary orders. (R Vol. I, pg, 5 Ln 21.) The magistrate court, in the interest of a fair 
proceeding and allowing the parties to present the evidence they wanted to present, decided to 
allow Zane·s expert witnesses and gave time for Chelsea to obtain an expert who would be able 
to do an evaluation in Montana. For this reason, the trial court was more inclined to permit 
on shortened audiovisual means and is why made her motion for 
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Savage to appear via Skype at the earliest 
of the evidence presented at both the temporary hearing 
then made its decision based on the evidence presented. 
C. Statement of Facts 
. The court I to 
the trial, weighed the and 
On or about February 14, 2003, Chelsea and Zane were married in Idaho Falls, Idaho. (R 
Vol. I, p. 11, L. 2-3.) The parties' twin girls were (Id. at Ln. 8-9.) On or 
about February 29t\ 2008, Chelsea was awarded a Divorce from Zane pursuant to Idaho Code§ 
32-603 on the grounds of Zane committing adultery. (R Vol. L p. 23, Ln. 17-20.) At the time of 
the Decree of Divorce, the parties were awarded joint legal custody of their minor children, with 
Chelsea being awarded primary physical custody, subject to Zane's visitation rights. (Id. at Ln. 
21-24.) Zane's visitation rights were any given Saturday he desired from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 
p.m.; 3 evenings per month from 6:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m., with prior arrangements made with 
Plaintiff; and no overnight privileges at the time due to Zane's living arrangements. (Id. at p. 24, 
Ln. 1 .) The Default Decree of Divorce does not restrict moving from the state or relocation of 
either parent. (R Vol. I, p. 22-27.) 
Since the time they were born, prior to the divorce, and also currently, the children's 
primary care giver has been Chelsea. (Id. at p. 121, Hr'g Tr 101:22-24; Id. at p. 38, Ln. 3-4; Id. at 
p. 66, Ln. 28-30.) At some point within the past six years, Chelsea and Zane, informally and 
outside of court, agreed to modify the visitation schedule to every other weekend to allow for the 
girls to have overnight visitation with Zane so that he could be more involved. (Id. at p. 108, 
Hr' g Tr 51: 1-8.) After the agreement and depending on Zane's work schedule, Zane picked up 
Respondent's Brief 6 
children on Friday between 5 p.m. 10:00 and returned the children 
morning before church started. (Id. at p. Ln. l ) Zane also a short period time 
during Christmas break and summer convenient to Zane's work schedule. (Id.) Zane's visitation 
for approximately the past 6 years has amounted to approximately 60 days each year. (Id. at p. 
61, Ln. 13-14.) Zane's visitation after the magistrate court's decision has increased to 
approximately days each year. (Id. at p. 69, Ln 24- p. 70, Ln 7.) 
The children began attending the Havre District 16 fifth grade class at the beginning of 
October. which was approximately 10 weeks before trial. (R Vol. I, p. 63, Ln 7-10). The children 
excelled in Havre's school as evidenced by report cards, certificates of excellence, and 
testimony. (Id.) The children have made positive adjustments top Havre, Montana. (Id. at Ln. 17-
18.) There are many opportunities for electives, sports, and extracurricular activities for the 
children in the Havre School system. (Id. at p. 67, Ln 12-13.) The Havre school is within walking 
distance from Chelsea's home. (Id. at Ln 15-16.) Due to the new career of Chelsea's husband in 
Havre, Chelsea will be able to stay at home full-time to care for her 4 children. (Id. at Ln 16-17: 
Id. at p. 132, Hr'g Tr 146:2-5.) 
Chelsea married Daniel Sorensen in August 2009. (R Vol. I, p. 117, Hr'g Tr 84: 17-22.) 
Chelsea and Daniel have 2 children together. (Id. at 84:23-85: 1 ). H.S. was  
and G.S. was  on (Id. at p. 60, Ln 18-19.) Daniel Sorensen received 
two offers of employment out of almost 30 applications that were sent out (Id. at Ln 26-27.) 
Daniel rejected the offer for Medicine Bow, Wyoming as there would be no doctor overseeing 
Respondent's Brief 7 
Daniel to on own to 
his own limitations. (Id. at p. 130 Hr'g tr 138:21-1 ·l 
Zane married Brooke Casto in August 2010. (Tr Vol. I, p. 259, Ln 3-17.) The marriage 
ended in divorce in August of 2014. (Id.) Prior to the divorce, Zane had committed adultery 
multiple times, including with his current girlfriend, Kate Nice; furthermore, Brooke was 35 
weeks pregnant with their only child together the day Zane left her. (Id. at p. 274, Ln 4-p. 275 Ln 
11: R Vol. I, p. 116, Hr'g Tr 82: 11-12) Zane treats his stepchildren differently. (Tr Vol. I, p. 263. 
Ln 24-p.264 Ln 3.) Zane was good to his 7 year-old stepdaughter and treated her like she was his 
little girl. (Id. at p. 266, Ln 17-24.) Zane did not try to build a relationship with his stepson and 
was a lot tougher with him; some of the tough treatment was witnessed by the twin girls. (Id. at 
p. 271, Ln 17-p. 272 Ln 16.) Also, Chelsea's and Zane's twins during Zane's marriage to Brooke 
did not really maintain contact with any of their friends or extended family members except on 
holidays when Zane exercised his visitation rights. (Tr Vol. I, p. 283, Ln 18-20.) 
Zane lived in Boise while married to Brooke and would travel to their home in Blackfoot 
on the weekends. (Tr Vol. I, p. 279, Ln 6-9.) For the current visitation with Brooke's and Zane's 
child, Zane travels from Boise to exercise his visitation in Blackfoot. (Id. at p. 264, Ln 8-24.) 
Zane's employer, Concrete Placing, is headquartered in Boise where Zane has a cubicle. (R Vol. 
I. p. 110, Hr' g Tr 62: 13-24.) Zane also has an office in his pickup. (Id.) As a project manager, he 
will occasionally travel to visit job sites and works a typical Monday through Friday with 
exceptions at times. (Id. at p. 111, Hr'g Tr 63-23.) Recently, Zane's work projects have been in 
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Idaho; Hagerman, Idaho; and Boise. a new was 
to start in January 16. . L p. i 35. 11 L) 
During the time between the temporary order hearing on September 30, 2015. and the 
trial on December I 0, 2015, Zane spent about 50 percent of the time in Blackfoot and 50 percent 
of the time in Boise at the residence of his girlfriend Kate Nice. (Id. at p. 136, Ln 8-11.) For three 
months prior to the temporary order hearing, Zane spent more time in Boise than in Blackfoot in 
the residence of Kate. (R Vol. I, p. 111, Hr'g Tr 62:5-10.) At the time of the trial, Zane had 
continued to pay rent to Kate on their residence in Boise at the rate of $600.00 a month through 
at least December. (Tr Vol. I, p. 134, Ln 20-p. 135, Ln 5.) At the temporary order hearing, Zane 
told the court that he did not anticipate paying rent in the future on the Boise house and that he 
discussed it with Kate. (R Vol. I, p. 115, Hr'g Tr 76: 16-21.) Kate does not own the home at 
p. 111, Hr' g Tr 61: 19-20.) Kate shares physical custody of her own children with her ex-husband 
who lives in Boise. (Id. at p. 116, Hr'g Tr 82:25-83:5.) Kate has her children for 70 percent of 
the time or IO days and her ex-husband has them for four days. (Id. at 80: 16-18.) 
IL ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether Chelsea is entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
HI. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Chelsea claims her attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54, Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure 901 , 905, and 
908, Idaho Code § 12-120, and Idaho Code § 12-121. 
Respondent's Brief 9 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard for Determining Child Custody with Relocation 
It has been established that child custody determinations are committed to the sound 
discretion of the magistrate. Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 929, 934, 204 PJd 1140, 1145 (2009). 
The party seeking a modification to child custody has the burden ofjustifying a change in 
custody. Brownson v. Allen, 134 Idaho 60, 63, 995 P.2d 830, 833 (2000). The burden shifts to a 
relocating party, however, when relocating the child would violate the previous custody 
arrangement. Suter v. Biggers, 157 Idaho 542,546,337 P.3d 1271, 1275 (2014). In determining 
whether to grant the modification, "the paramount concern is the best interest of the child.'' 
Brownson, 134 Idaho at 63,995 P.2d at 833. Idaho Code§ 32-717(1) lists the direction for 
custody and the relevant factors to be considered in determining the best interests of the child as 
follows: 
In an action for divorce the court may, before and after judgment, give 
such direction for the custody, care and education of the children of the marriage 
as may seem necessary or proper in the best interests of the children. The court 
shall consider all relevant factors which may include: 
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his or her custody; 
(b) The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian; 
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent 
or parents. and his or her siblings; 
(d) The child's adjustment to his or her home, school, and community; 
(e) The character and circumstances of all individuals involved; 
(f) The need to promote continuity and stability in the life of the child; and 
(g) Domestic violence as defined in section 39-6303, Idaho Code, whether 
or not in the presence of the child. 
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. 1 
(2012). 
factors is not or mandatory courts are to consider other 
18. 281 096. 1100 
In relocation cases, the Court has stated: 
It would not be particularly helpful for this Court to enunciate a laundry 
list of factors that could or should be considered in this type of case. Factors 
relevant in some relocation cases may be irrelevant in others and, under the 
current framework, trial courts are free to consider factors unique to each case. 
Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 456, 197 P.3d 310, 317 (2008). Courts may consider factors not 
enumerated in section 32-717 to determine whether relocation is in the best interests of the 
children. ld. at 455, 197 P.3d at 316. Further, Idaho law does not impose a presumption against 
relocation. Petersen, 153 Idaho at 324, 281 P .3d at 1102. The best interests of the child standard 
governs relocation decisions. Bartosz, 146 Idaho at 456, 197 PJd at 3 I 7. A parent's move is 
only one factor to be considered when awarding custody. Id. at 457, 197 P.3d at 318. Several 
Idaho cases have upheld decisions allowing custodial parents to relocate with their children. Id. 
Once the parent seeking permission to relocate proves that relocation is in the child's best 
interest, he or she will be allowed to move with the child. Id. at 456-457, 197 P.3d at 317-318. 
B. Standard of Review 
The awarding of custody of minor children rests within the discretion of the trial court 
whose decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Roberts v. 
Roherts, 138 Idaho 401.403, 64 P.3d 327, 329 (2003). The magistrate court abuses its discretion 
only if it makes a custody award based on evidence that is insufficient to conclude that the award 
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s best V 710,713.1 P 3 ,378 A 
court does not abuse so as it as one 
acts within the outer limits of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to 
the available choices, and reaches its decision through an exercise of reason. Roberts, 13 8 Idaho 
at , 64 P.Jd at 329 (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co, 119 Idaho 87, 94. 
803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). 
When reviewing decisions of a magistrate, the Court will uphold the magistrate's 
findings of fact if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Ireland v. Ireland 
Idaho 955. 958,855 P.2d 40, 43 (1993). Appellate courts are not permitted to substitute their 
O\Vt1 view of the evidence for that of the trial court, nor to make credibility determinations. 
McGriffv. McGriff, 140Idaho642,645,99P.3d 111, 114(2004)(citingBrammerv. Brammer, 
93 Idaho 671,674,471 P.2d 58. 61 (1970)). In considering finding of fact made by the trial 
court, the reviewing court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed at trial. . . McGriff, 93 Idaho 642, 645.646, 99 P.3d 111, 114· l 15 (2004)(citing Pieper v. 
Pieper, 125 Idaho 667,669,873 P.2d 921,923 (1994)). 
C. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in determining it was in the 
children's best interest to relocate to Havre, Montana 
The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion because it reviewed and weighed each 
element cited in J.C. § 32· 717 and considered other factors including relocation and the 
children's age and opportunity to have a stay at home parent. (R Vol I, p. 59-69.) The magistrate 
court took into consideration the facts presented and ruled on the best interests of the children as 
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an act of reason. (Jd.) magistrate court as an act at 
p. 65Ln 3-6; p. 67 Ln 5 and p. 69, Ln 3.) With child custody relocation cases the results 
depend upon the facts. Weiland v. Ruppel, 139 Idaho 122, 125, 75 P.3d 176, 179 (2003). As set 
forth below, the magistrate court acted within the outer limits of its discretion to weigh the facts 
in evidence relating to the best interests of the children and the move to Havre and found that 
Chelsea had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the best interests of the 
children to relocate to Havre. Montana. 
a. The Wishes o(the Parents as to his or her custody 
The magistrate court found and considered that the wishes of Chelsea were for continued 
primary physical custody with her in Havre, Montana and that she proposed two different plans 
for visitations if it were to be granted. (R Vol. I, p.62, Ln 20-22, p. 66 Ln 26.) The court also 
took into consideration Zane's wishes that the children remain and continue to be raised in the 
Blackfoot area. (Jd. at p. 61, Ln 12, p. 68, Ln 9-10.) Zane expressed that he did not care if he 
received primary physical custody or if Chelsea did, just so Jong as the children remained in 
Blackfoot. (Tr Vol. I, p. 126, Ln 10-19.) The judge exercised reason in determining that the 
wishes of the parents were factors on both the children moving to Havre and for Chelsea to 
remain in Blackfoot with primary physical custody or primary physical custody being awarded to 
Zane. (R Vol. I, p. 66 Ln 26, p. 68, Ln 9-10.) 
Zane argues that the court improperly considered Chelsea's position over the best 
interests of the children. (Appellant Br., p. 39, Ln 9-10.) The magistrate considered both the 
wishes of Chelsea and Zane as regards custody. Infra. Further, the magistrate court considered 
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ldren a at m Infra. court 
that the children would have as and 
activities in the Havre School system. Infra. The evidence actually indicates that the children 
would have more opportunity for extracurricular activities and school opportunities with daily 
physical education and weekly music education. Infra. The girls also have their own rooms in 
Havre. Infra. The magistrate court recognized that the children have been living with their 
mother since birth or more than ten years and have seen their father every other weekend for the 
past six years. (R. Vol. I, p. 67, Ln 18-21.) The magistrate court evaluated the evidence with 
regard to the children's positions and best interests, not with regard to Chelsea's position. 
h. The Wishes o(the Children as to his or her custodian 
The magistrate court found that the wishes of the children were neutral in regards to their 
custodian. (R Vol. I, p. 66, Ln 27.) The court commented that the children did not wish to say 
anything bad about either parent and that they love both Chelsea and Zane. (Id. at p. 63 Ln 31.) 
c. The interaction and interrelationship o[rhe child with his or her parent or 
parents, and his or her siblings 
The magistrate court found this factor to weigh in favor of the children relocating with 
Chelsea. (R Vol. I, p. 66, Ln 28-p. 67 Ln 1.) The court found that Chelsea has been the primary 
caregiver for the children and her parenting skills were lauded by various witnesses. (Id.) The 
relationship of caregiver that Chelsea has had with the girls has been for the girls' whole Jives. 
(Id. at p. 121, Hr' g Tr 100:22:24.) Chelsea also taught the children one year in grade school. (Id. 
at p. 122, Hr'g Tr 106:21-24.) Chelsea has taught the twins responsibility with assigning regular 
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to them. (Tr Vol p. 3 10-18.) Chelsea has also been the one that has taken 
children to church and the church activity days in Havre. (Tr Vol. I, p. 7, Ln 22-p. 338, Ln 5; 
R Vol. L p. 120, Hr' g Tr 97: 15-19.) Chelsea's role as the primary caregiver has created a 
relationship with the children where the children know who they are consistently responsible to 
and who they can rely on for care. Zane has had the children every other weekend for six plus 
including during the summer months. (R Vol. I, pl 08, Hr' g Tr 51 :4-11 ; R Vol. I, p. 120, 
Hr' g Tr 97: 15-19).The longest consecutive period he has had with the girls was a vacation for 
one week. (R Vol. I, p. 120, Hr'g Tr 97:20-22.) 
While it is true that the twin girls have a sibling from Zane's second marriage to Brooke 
the children have had daily interaction with their two brothers from the marriage of 
Chelsea and Daniel Sorensen and have been substantially involved in their brothers' lives. (R 
Vol. I. p. 67 Ln 7-9.) Dean Bonney, Chelsea's Father, testified to the relationship that the 
children have with their brothers: 
Q. Have you observed the interaction of those girls and their younger 
brothers? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And what have you observed? 
A. That they love their younger brothers. They get exasperated with their 
younger brothers as well when they get into their stuff. They're very good 
caretakers. yeah. they love them and look out for them and take care of them. 
(Tr Vol. L p. 307, Ln 11.) 
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a non-issue. (Appel 
should 
Br.. p. 32, ) 
to remain m this 
argument is speculative not 
on the facts of the case. Chelsea intended to move to Havre and when given a hypothetical 
regarding whether she would accept the visitation she had offered Zane when she moved, 
Chelsea stated: 
Q. If you-if my client received the primary physical custody, would you 
agree that this visitation schedule is acceptable for you? 
A. If the Court found that it was in their best interest that Zane got physical 
primary custody, I would accept what is in the best interest of my children. If this 
is the custody and if this the visitation schedule that resulted from that, I would 
accept that. 
(R . I, p. 126, Hr'g Tr 121:6-13.) 
d The child ·s adiustment to his or her home, school, and community_ 
The magistrate court weighed the best interests of the children as regards both allowing 
the children to move to Havre and having the children stay in Blackfoot. (R Vol. I, p. 67, Ln 10-
17 and p. 68, Ln 8-9.) Ultimately, after considering the factor, the magistrate court concluded 
that the factor argued in favor of alJowing the children to relocate with Chelsea. (Id. at p. 66. Ln 
23-25 and p. 67, Ln 12-17.) The magistrate court found that there were many opportunities for 
electives, sports, and extracurricular activities in the Havre School system and that the children 
had made a good adjustment to their school in Havre. (Id. at p. 67, Ln 12-14.) The magistrate 
court found that at the time of trial and almost ten weeks in Havre that the children were doing 
well in school as "evidenced by their report cards, their certificates of excellence, and according 
to the testimony heard by the court.'· (Id. at p. 63, Ln 8-10.) 
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children have amazed their teachers in are doing. 
I, p. 3 Ln 19-25.) The children have academic were 
recognized at an awards assembly. (Id. at p. 354, Ln 18-22.) The school in Havre is 
approximately three blocks from the residence of Chelsea. (Id. at p. 332, Ln 6-8.) In Havre, the 
children have Physical Education every day as opposed to Blackfoot. (Id. at p. 368, Ln 3-6.) The 
children receive musical education in Havre for a solid hour or more twice per week; Blackfoot 
does not have that. (Id. at p. 368, Ln 7-9.) The children have learned to make new friends in 
Havre. (Id. at p. 358. Ln 7-8.) 
In Blackfoot, the twin girls were in the same room and did not have a lot of furnishings; 
in Havre, the twin girls have their own room with their own private space. (Id. at p. 335, Ln 2-
14.) The children are participating in extracurricular activities in Havre, such as taking piano 
lessons and basketball. (Id. at p. 336. Ln 9-16.) The piano lessons were something that Chelsea 
was not able to pay for before and was paid for by her father-in-law. (Id. at p. 359, Ln 7-8; p. 
368, Ln 21-23.) The children are going to try ice skating and possibly hockey because there are 
leagues in Havre and the children have friends that play. (Id. at p. 359, Ln 13-16.) The children 
will do more and have more opportunities in the Havre community because Chelsea will be able 
to afford them; Chelsea could not afford extracurricular activities and the children were limited 
to one sport in Blackfoot. (Id. at p. 368, Ln 10-13.) 
e. The character and circumsrances of all individuals involved 
The magistrate court weighed the character and circumstances of all individuals factor 
and concluded that it argued in favor of the Court determining that the children should be 
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to the p. p. Although 
magistrate court ruled that the character and circumstances are essential the same, it elaborated 
on the circumstances of both parties being stable and being able to provide an adequate 
home for the children to meet their physical needs. (Id.) 
f. The need to promote continuity and stability in the life o(the child 
The magistrate court weighed the need to promote continuity and stability in the life of 
the children and concluded that the factor argues in favor of the Court determining that the 
children should be allowed to relocate with Chelsea to Havre. (R Vol. I, p. 66, Ln 23-25and p. 
67, Ln 18-21.) The court found that the children have been living with Chelsea since birth or 
more than ten years. (Id. at p. 67, Ln 19-20.) Chelsea has been the primary caregiver for all of the 
children's lives and been established in her home for their entire lives. (Id. at p. 121, Hr'g Tr 
100:22-25.) The twin girls have been living in a family unit with Chelsea and Daniel Sorensen 
for the past six years for at least 300 days out of the year. Supra. Chelsea and Daniel have a 
marriage and stable relationship and the children have a stable relationship with Chelsea. (Tr 
Vol. I, p. 338, Ln 12-14.) Chelsea will be at home each day as a stay at home mother and the 
children will know where she is each day. Supra. 
Zane's relationship with Kate Nice is not stable as Kate will have to stay in Boise due to 
her custody arrangement regardless of whether Zane resides in Blackfoot for more than 50 
percent of the time. (R Vol. I, p. 114, Hr'g Tr 73:24-74:2.) Zane's work location is unstable as 
his cubicle is in Boise and he travels frequently for work. Supra. Zane does not have a job where 
he II be in the same place each day as he is required to manage projects and there are 
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to through . I, p. 111, g .) 
cannot provide a it is 
the children or Zane will be doing between Boise and Blackfoot for his work or for his 
relationship. The children would have to develop intimate stable relationships with Kate Nice 
and her children. These may be long-term relationships or short-term depending on the whims of 
the adults. Chelsea can provide a stable environment for the girls as she has their entire lives; 
whereas, Zane cannot at this time. 
The magistrate court also weighed the need to promote continuity of living in Blackfoot 
as a factor which argued for Chelsea to remain in Bingham County with the Children or that 
custody be transferred to Zane. (R Vol. I, p. 68, Ln 1-6.) This weight was apparently based on 
the children having family and friends in the area and no family members extended in Havre. (Id. 
at p. 68, Ln 8-9.) As such, the magistrate court did take into consideration the broader view of 
Chelsea staying in Blackfoot or Zane receiving primary physical custody, but reasonably decided 
that the stability and continuity of the home outweighed the continuity of the community. (Id. at 
p. 68, Ln 1-9.) 
g Domestic Violence as deflned in section 39-6303, Idaho Code, whether or not in 
the presence ofthe child 
The Court did not find any domestic violence issues in this case. 
h. Relocation 
The magistrate court stated that simply because there is a financial component to this 
request that does not necessarilv mean that the move is, or is not. in the best interest of the . . . 
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I, p. 68, The court also cited to Roberts and 
indicating that financial reasons alone may not moving the children outside of the area; 
however. a financial reason is a factor to consider in assessing what is in the children's best 
interest. (Id. at p. 68, Ln 16-19; A1ark:woodv. Markwood, 152 Idaho 756,274 P.3d 1 l (201 
The magistrate court found an "almost companion case" in Danti. (R Vol. I, p. 69, Ln 7-
8.) In Dant/. the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Magistrate allowing a mother to 
move away and affirmed the paramount factor is that the Court considers the best interest of the 
children and in Dan ti the Court explicitly considered the nature of the relationship between the 
custodial parent in relation to the non-custodial parent along with the other factors. (ld. at p. 69, 
Ln 10-14.) In this case the magistrate court has weighed the best interests of the child factors 
along with relocation to determine that the best interests of the children are best served by 
relocating with Chelsea to Havre. Supra. 
argues that Clair is similar regarding relocation to this case brought before the 
Court; however, there are substantial distinctions that make Clair unfit as a companion relocation 
case. (Appellante Br. 29-30.) In Clair, the Court was reviewing a case where the magistrate court 
had filed an order prohibiting the parties from removing the child from the state without a leave 
of court and ostensibly the mother was to stay within 25 miles of Pocatello: the order was neither 
observed, not sought to be enforced. Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 281, 281 P.3d 115, 118 
(2012). In this case, Chelsea and Zane's divorce decree has no limitation on moving particular 
distances away from any city or out of state. Supra. The father in Clair gave up career 
opportunities in Moscow, Idaho, to return to live in Pocatello on a full-time basis. Id. Zane 
Respondent's Brief 20 
no to a 
percent of the time in Boise at a residence that he 
to 
rent to his girlfriend. 
at 
Also, unlike the children in this case, the child in Clair was the parties only natural child and not 
in an established home and family unit with a step-father and with two younger siblings. Id. 
The magistrate court has created a reasonable visitation schedule to accommodate the 
move to Havre. which will allow for Zane to have more overall time with children to maintain 
his frequent and continuing contact pursuant to Idaho Code~ 32-717B. Six plus years ago, Zane 
went to a schedule that reduced the frequency of visits from every Saturday to every other week 
so that he could be "more involved" with overnight visitation. (R Vol. L p. 108, Hr'g Tr 50:22-
51 :3.) With the magistrate court's visitation schedule. Zane can be even more involved as he will 
have longer periods of visitation; he has two weeks out of every summer month, which is longer 
than any previous continuous period he has had with the children. Supra. 
i. Age of Children and Stay at Home Mother 
The magistrate court considered that the opportunity in Havre would allow for the 
children to have a mother at home with them rather than be outside of the home. (R Vol. I, 
p. 68. Ln 20-22.) The magistrate court considered this to be important as the children were 
entering their pre-teen years. (Id.) Chelsea would not be able to stay home and care for the 
children if she were to remain in Blackfoot. Further, with Zane's work and travel, he has not 
provided a way in which he would be able to stay at home with the children. 
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set § 17 other 
found that it was in interests to to 
husband, and their two children. 
D. The magistrate court's findings were based on substantial and competent 
evidence and the expert testimony was properly weighed. 
As discussed the magistrate court weighed the evidence presented at trial and facts of the 
case in relation to the best interests of the children. Supra. In describing how it weighed evidence 
the magistrate court stated on the record: 
And let me give you some insight of maybe how I look at these things. On 
relevance, some things may be more relevant than others. And, you know, 
often-as I have to take things into consideration, you know, is it a ten, or is it a 
one? .. But-and I will look at all in its totality ..... 
. . . . But understand--and both sides-and as it is with all evidence, some is 
more important that others, especially because we're dealing specifically here 
with a child custody issue and -about children and where they should live 
primarily. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 270. Ln 20-p. 271 Ln 8.) 
The magistrate court put on record that it heard the testimony of witnesses and received 
certain exhibits into evidence and that it fully considered the evidence presented at trial and the 
arguments of counsel. (R Vol. I, p. 58, Ln 22-25.) The magistrate court added that factual issues 
about which there was conflicting testimony and evidence were resolved by determining the 
evidence that was most credible. (Id. at p. 58, Ln 29-30.) 
Further, the weight to be given .to expert testimony is for the trier of fact. Matter of'Bahy Boy 
Doe, 127 Idaho 452, 460, 902 P.2d 477, 485 (1995)( citing State v. Blair, 9 I Idaho 13 7, 138, 417 
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weight of 
presented; therefore, the magistrate court is not required to take a position on piece of 
evidence and weigh it formally in its decision. It is important to note that the magistrate court 
decided that it was in the best interests of the children to temporarily relocate to Havre after the 
temporary order hearing. The temporary order hearing did not have any expert testimony and the 
decision was based on the facts and evidence presented. The conclusion from the magistrate 
court not putting specific information from the experts in its findings could be that the magistrate 
court didn't find the experts helpful or compelling when weighing the best interests of the 
children. 
L The testimony of Kristen Griggs was insufficient, incompetent, and not 
substantially fact based to conclude that the children's best interests were served 
by the children staying in Blackfoot. 
Ms. Griggs's testimony regarding attachment was based on theory and not fact rooted in 
the case. (Tr Vol. I, p. 63, Ln 7-10 and 13-14). Ms. Griggs does not do child custody evaluations. 
(Id. at p. 84, Ln 20-21.) Ms. Griggs made her opinions without meeting the children. (Id. at p. 84, 
Ln 22-23.) Ms. Griggs had not met with Chelsea or Dan Sorensen. (Id. at p. 242, Ln 24-p. 243, 
Ln 1.) Ms. Griggs had only met Zane for the first time after her testimony on the first day of trial. 
(Id. at p. 243, Ln 4-5.) When asked a question regarding a schedule for visitation with the 
children living in Havre, Ms. Griggs would not give an answer and stated: 
I think it would depend on the developmental age of the children, their-
how they feel about it. There's so many factors that, without knowing the girls in 
this case or the situation as far as it pertains to them specifically, 1 don't know that 
that can be determined by me. 
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at p. 
A reasonable person not conclude that s 
or deserve any weight for determining the best interests of the children because she herself 
admitted that she does not know the girls or the situation as it pertains to them. 
2. The testimony of Blair Garner was insufficient, incompetent, and too patently 
biased to conclude that the children's best interests were served by the children 
staying in Blackfoot. 
Mr. Garner's last time to do a custody evaluation was probably five or six years ago. (Tr 
Vol. L p. I 06, Ln 25-p. 107, Ln 5.) Mr. Garner first met the children during a home visit on 
October 3. 2015, before the girls had moved to Havre. (Id. at p. 96. Ln 13-20; p. 107. Ln 6-13.) 
The second time Mr. Garner met with the children was about two weeks later and at some point 
between visit one and visit two, the children had moved to Havre. (Id. at p. 107, Ln 15-21.) 
When asked what his opinion on the best interests of the children were after his two visits and 
what should happen, he stated the following: 
I guess I do. I do have an opinion. And, you know, unfortunately, there is 
damage, if you want to call it that to their social structure. How much damage is 
going to occur developmentally, I don't know. I think, in these types of situations, 
it's-you know, it's a guessing game. It's a gamble, regardless of how you pick 
and choose. 
But in order to reduce or minimize damage, the ideal thing in my mind 
would be to restore their previous social structure, their previous environment as 
much as is possible, which-which, at this point, would be for the-for the 
nuclear family of the-well, I can't call it nuclear family per se, because we're-
you know. we could be talking biological parents-but for their mother and 
stepfather, Chelsea and Dan Sorensen, to live in Blackfoot and carry on the same 
type of level of activity and schedule that they previously have had. 
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atp.lOL 19.) 
Garner guessed at having an opinion; his pick and interests of the children 
was for Chelsea and Daniel to stay in Blackfoot and carry on the same schedule as they 
previously had in Blackfoot. He made that choice without consulting with Chelsea and Daniel or 
visiting Havre. Further, he was unsure about if any "damage" would even occur or if that was 
even the term to use. He did not provide any of his child custody evaluations, reports, or findings 
as exhibits for the magistrate court to look at, nor did he comprehensively describe what those 
visitations entailed as far as what information he sought or what questions he asked. 
When asked the similar question that was asked of Ms. Griggs regarding the best 
visitation schedule for the status quo of the children being in Havre. Mr. Garner would not give 
an answer. (Id. at p 116, Ln 8-25.) Mr. Garner demonstrated his bias and further incompetence 
when the magistrate court asked a question for clarification regarding adults traveling instead of 
children: 
Court: If the children are ordered to remain in Montana, is it your 




No. I'm not suggesting that. 
I'm just trying to get it clear, because-what are you 
Witness: I'm suggesting that-excuse me, Your Honor. Are you 
saying if the children are in Montana? 
Court: If they're-I gave the scenario if they're ordered to return 
to Blackfoot. That was my first scenario. 
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are 
Witness: No disrespect meant, but I don't believe that that would be 
an acceptable alternative either, given it was not his choice to change the current 
situation. 
Court: Well, I'm not-I'm worried about what is best for the 
children. 1 don't care what-I'm not focusing on what's best for the parents. 
Witness: I understand. I understand. 
Court: My question is would be best for the children? 
Any you said it would be best for the mother to move 
down-I mean, travel down. I understand that. 
Witness: Yes. sir. 
Court: In the alternative, what would be best for the children? 
Witness: Well, the answer-the answer would be it's always easier 
for adults to travel, regardless of who the adult is, over children traveling. 
(Tr Vol. 1, p. 255, Ln 21-p. 257. Ln 1.) 
A reasonable person could not conclude that Mr. Garner's opinion would have any basis 
or deserve any weight for determining the best interests of the children because he did not 
provide basis for his opinions, which he admitted was guesswork, and he was patently biased. 
E. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Chelsea's expert 
witness to testify via "Skype" or other generally accepted videoconferencing 
software and technology. 
The testimony of Chelsea's expert witness was properly allowed by the magistrate court 
as evidence because it had probative value in relation to the children's best interests and is 
allowed under the relaxed evidentiarv standards and intent of the Idaho Rules of Familv Law J , 
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strate court an 
witness in a family iaw case to open court magistrate court 
and explained its ruling as follows: 
l didn't notice that either party filed for the formal rules of evidence; so 
they're a little !axed. 
I can tell you my ruling, Mr. Dummar. I mean, I've looked at it. I've 
talked, actually, in fact, with the administrative judge and talked to the court 
administrator. I've talked with the judges. And I know that our technology is 
always emerging, and I want to be fair. 
And the opinion I got from everyone and through my research as well is 
that it would be allowable. And that was my opinion earlier. 
(Tr Vol. I, p. 11, Ln 13-25.) 
Neither party filed a motion or petition required by the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure 
Rule l 02. As such the standard for admittance of evidence is more relaxed as IRFLP 102. B.2 
states in part: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, provided, however, that the court shall 
exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or by considerations of undue delay waste of 
time. needless presentation of cumulative evidence, lack of reliability or failure to 
adequately and timely disclose same. 
IDAHO R FAMILY LAW P. 102.B.2(2016). 
The Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure are to be "liberallv construed and enforced in a 
. ,; 
manner to secure the just, prompt and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding." IDAHO R. FAMILY LAW P. 101 (2016). 
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"Skype" or other ly accepted and technology was an 
inexpensive way for Chelsea's expert witness to appear open court during the trial proceedings 
and give testimony to ensure a just result. Also, Zane did not suffer any unfair prejudice as 
Chelsea made a motion for the expert to appear via "Skype" or other generally accepted video 
conferencing software and technology and a hearing was held on the matter on November 19, 
2015, well in advance of the trial date. (R Vol. I, p. 6. Ln 14-17.) Zane's counsel was able to 
cross-examine the expert. (Tr Vol. L p 188, Ln 22-p.202. Ln 8.) If there was any issue with 
conducting cross-examination with the technology was unreasonably amplified by the overt, 
unreasonable impatience of Zane's counsel. (Id. at p. 196, Ln 2-p. 198, Ln 17.) Further, Zane's 
experts were able to sit and see the testimony of Chelsea's expert, which was not an advantage 
that Chelsea's expert had. 
In making his argument against allowing testimony of an expert via "Skype" or other 
generally accepted videoconferencing software and technology, Zane cites to two cases outside 
ofidaho; neither were family law cases, neither involved relaxed evidentiary standards, and 
neither had procedural rules created to be liberally construed and enforced in a manner to secure 
the just, prompt and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. (Appellant Br., p. 
14-15 and p. 17-19.) The first case cited was an Alabama probate case involving a jury and a 
witness that appeared via telephone (not "Skype" or other generally accepted videoconferencing 
technology). Greener v. Killough, 1 So. 3d 93 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008). The definition of "open 
court" cited by the Greener court does not address the attendance or appearance of witnesses. Id. 
at 102. Further, the main concern of the Committee Comments on the 1973 Adoption of Rule 
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was of so as to determine 
more their veracity lack thereof) and the weight to 
1973 concern is alleviated through "Skype" or other generally accepted videoconferencing 
software technology which allows the trier of fact to see the demeanor of the witness and to 
determine veracity and weight of testimony. In this case, the magistrate court was the trier of fact 
and was able to see the demeanor of Chelsea's expert witness to determine the veracity and 
·weight of the testimony given. 
The second case cited was a Seventh Circuit federal prisoner grievance case involving a 
the actual prisoner and party to the case participated in the trial by videoconference. 
Perotti v. Quinones, 790 F.Jd 712 (7th Cir. 2015). The Seventh Circuit commented that despite 
its limitations, challenges to decisions to have a witness (including an inmate) participate in court 
proceeding by video conferencing have been rejected in a variety of contexts. Id. at 724. 
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit found that the district judge did not abuse her discretion in 
denying the prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum and having the 
prisoner instead testify and participate in the trial by video conferencing. Id. at 729. 
Rule 712 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure Rules states the following: 
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, 
unless otherwise provided by statute or by these rules, the Idaho rules of 
Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Idaho. 
fDAHO R. FAMILY LAW P. 712 (2016). 
As previously stated "open court" does not address the attendance or presence of a witness; 
however, Chelsea's expert witness was accessible, visible, and subject to examination of both 
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and her testimony orally. Supra. When Rule 712 is construed and 
in a manner to secure the just. prompt and inexpensive determination every action and 
proceeding, it must a1!ow for oral testimony via "Skype" or other generally accepted video 
conferencing software and technology in a child custody case. 
F. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Ms. Savage's 
testimony. 
Idaho Rules of Evidence 702 states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
fDAHO R. EVIDENCE 702 (2016). 
Ms. Savage qualified as an expert on child custody and evaluating the best interests of a 
child through her knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education. (Tr Vol. I, p. 144, Ln 3-
p.146. Ln 9.) Ms. Savage spoke with Chelsea nd all of her children for approximately 15 
minutes, then the twin girls and evaluated them for approximately 45 minutes prior to speaking 
to Chelsea and her husband. (Id. at p. 151, Ln 20-25 and p. 194, Ln 1-3) Chelsea and her 
husband then came back to Ms. Savage's office for another hour long visit. (Id. at p. 194, Ln 
11.) Ms. Savage received information to review regarding the case prior to her testimony (See 
Tr Vol. I, p. 144-p.206.) 
G. Zane erroneously and unilaterally applies the "tender years doctrine" to the 
magistrate court's decision. 
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court that had to at to care 
children in Havre. (R Vol. I, p.67. Ln 16-17.) The court is allowed to take other factors 
consideration not listed in Idaho Code§ 32-717. Supra. It did so and stated: 
The Court has also considered the ages of the children. As they enter their 
pre-teen years, the issues of maturation are important. Having a stay at home 
mother is an important consideration for the court. 
(R Vol. I, p.68, Ln 20-22.) The magistrate court did not say that it was applying the tender age 
doctrine, hut rather emphasized that Chelsea would be able to stay at home. Zane attempts to 
create case law regarding the gender of the parent by erroneously applying the tender age 
doctrine when the magistrate court clearly emphasized the stay at home language and the 
opportunity for the young children to have a full-time parent without a work schedule. Had Zane 
been able to be a full-time stay at home father, the magistrate court would have considered it and 
weighed the factor in his favor. 
H. Chelsea should be awarded her attorney fees on appeal. 
Chelsea requests that the Court order that her attorney fees be awardable on appeal. See 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P .3d 130, 
(2005); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54 (2016); IDAHO APP. R. 41 (2016); IDAHO CODE §12-120 
(2016); and IDAHO CODE § 12-121. Chelsea was the prevailing party by decision and judgment 
against Zane in the magistrate court because she obtained the best result in regards to the best 
interest of the children. (R Vol. I, p. 69-70, IDAHO R. CTV. P. 54(2016)). Further, the award is 
within the court's discretion under Idaho Code ~ 12-121, if the court was "left with the abiding 
he lief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably. or without 
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V. 139Idaho 1. Chelsea 
he awarded her attorney fees for defending the appeal as Zane has pursued this appeal 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Supra. Chelsea reserves the right to make 
further argument in relation to attorney fees at the time of oral argument pursuant to Idaho 
Appellant Rule 44(b). 
V. CONCLUSION AND RELEIF REQUESTED 
As a result of the foregoing, the magistrate court order allowing the children to relocate 
with Chelsea should be affirmed and Chelsea should be awarded her attorney fees in defending 
this appeal and the magistrate court action. 
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